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The article explores the polarisation within the body of twentieth century criti-
cism surrounding Samuel Beckett’s work: A polarisation between strict forma-
list approaches which tend to see Beckett as very much part of a modernist 
tradition and poststructuralist theorists who seek to categorise his work  
in terms of postmodernism. As an unfortunate result of extreme critical 
standpoints, the philosophical thinking of Schopenhauer, which had such  
a profound and lasting influence on both Beckett’s approach to writing as well 
as to the theatre, has been largely ignored or simply pushed to one side. 
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Introduction 
 
The reason that the heroic and uncompromising enterprise undertaken 
by Beckett in creating his extreme aesthetic has not been satisfactorily explored is 
mainly due to the nature of the criticism he has historically attracted. Though 
much of this critical work is both excellent and interesting, nevertheless, it seems 
to be more preoccupied with setting its own agenda in either too rigidly narro-
wing its scope, or being concerned to both validate itself and Beckett's work in 
terms of modernity, without fully responding to the true nature and intentions of 
his aesthetic. In respect to this I will take an historical retrospective in order to 
discuss some of the major critical works on Beckett and outline two broad catego-
ries which are the most representative of the critical approaches to Beckett's 
work. In terms of this polarisation of critical approaches it is also both curious an 
unfortunate that Schopenhauer is either ignored or pushed to one side. And this, 
despite the fact that it was on Schopenhauer’s gloomy philosophy that Beckett 
largely formulated his approach both to writing and to the theatre.    
Even a casual glance at the body of critical work surrounding Samuel 
Beckett’s writings reveals that there are two broad approaches to his oeuvre. The 
first and largest body has tended to see Beckett's work in the formalist sense as a 
largely self-referential linguistic circuit, whose language like the mind of Murphy, 
is hermetically sealed. The second and generally more recent approach has been 
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to locate Beckett as the perfect site for applying poststructuralist textual theory, 
as if his work intentionally exemplified and represented Postmodernism per se1 2. 
 
The Formalist Approach 
 
Of the first or formalist approach arguably the most representative and 
most quoted is Brian Fitch's Beckett and Babel3, even though the work was pu-
blished as early as 1988. Fitch, perhaps a little unfairly considering the stated aim 
of his work, is frequently criticised for the extreme position he adopts4. For 
example, in setting up the theoretical framework for his study he argues that: 
 
... the second versions of Beckett's texts (those written in translation) have, in 
my opinion, to be considered part of an intra-textuality of his work and to be 
seen as participating in a dynamic interaction between different texts. For if 
the concept of 'the complete works' of a writer has largely been discredited in 
the context of what the French have termed 'La modernité', it has its contem-
porary equivalent in that intra-textuality, a variant of textuality. On the level of 
texts as texts in the strict sense of the term there exists a whole range of inter-
play through which the texts of a writer comment on one another without any 
intervention on the part of the author...5  
 
Fitch's attempt to outline this process of 'intra-textuality' is difficult to 
follow. However, he seems to have applied this rather awkward concept in order 
                                                          
1 Anna Smith notes this problem when she claims that outwardly at least Beckett's fictions bear  
a striking resemblance to deconstruction's conception of identity as a mesh of difference (A. Smith, 
Proceeding by Aporia: Perception and Poetic language in Samuel Beckett's “Worstward Ho”, 
“Journal of Beckett Studies”, Vol. 1.3, Horida State University, No. I. Autumn 1993, p.23).  
2 Smith is applying this statement from her understanding of Jakobson's theory of 'poetic 
language'; i.e., poetic language reflects the instability of representation by an overt hostility both 
to closure of meaning and to fixed, substantial identities (Ibidem). Smith in a footnote of her 
own goes on to explain that “according to Jakobson, poetic language occurs when the referential 
content of a speech is overridden by an emphasis on the message as form” (p. 35. Also see  
R. Jakobson, Linguistics and Poetics, in Selected Writing III, Mouton 1981). 
3 For early discussion and debate on the positioning of Beckett's work within Postmodernism, 
see Breon Mitchell's Samuel Beckett and the Postmodernism Controversy; Sel. Papers 
Presented at Workshop on Postmodernism at the XIth International. Compar. Lit. Cong, Paris, 
20-24 Aug. 1985. Publ. in Exploring Postmodernism viii, Eds. Calincescu Matei & Fokkema 
Douwe, Benjamins. Amsterdam 1987, pp. 109-121. 
B.T. Fitch, Beckett and Babel: An Investigation into the Bilingual Status of the Work, 
University of Toronto Press 1988. 
4 B.T. Fitch, Beckett and Babel: An Investigation into the Bilingual Status of the Work, 
University of Toronto Press 1988. Christopher Ricks, for example, in criticism of Fitch adopts  
a tone of near disdain when he writes ‘In such discourse' Fitch's Beckett and Babel, as it calls 
itself, we are in another world than that of Beckett’s greatness, his being an art which never is so 
complacent as to deny the existence of the without ‘pregnable’ as it fertilely is’. C. Ricks, 
Beckett's Dying Word, Clarendon Press. Oxford 1990, p.151. 
5 B.T. Fitch, Beckett and Babel, p. 29-30, notes that "intra-textuality" is a modification of the 
term "inter-textuality". 
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to express the extra dimension exhibited between the original French or English 
versions of Beckett's fiction and those retranslated by the author into either lan-
guage. Not only is Fitch considering the way that original and translation refer to 
each other but in 'taking them on the level of text as texts in the strict sense of the 
term' and their tendency to 'comment on one another’ to the exclusion of any 
'intervention' suggests a rather limited concern in looking at these 'works' prima-
rily as part of an enclosed linguistic field. 
However, the reason for such a clear cut hermeneutic response is sugge-
sted by the full title which Fitch gives to his study, Beckett and Babel: An Investi-
gation into the Status of the Bilingual work. It is in part the very fact that Beckett 
has just such a bilingual 'status' that he attracts the kind of criticism which tends, 
in its most extreme form, to look at the works primarily in terms of a linguistic 
and intertextual process, marginalising or excluding most other areas of explora-
tion. This tendency to look at Beckett's work in such a narrow way was set as 
early as 1964 in John Fletcher's highly influential The Novels of Samuel Beckett 
in which he refers to the 'hermetically sealed perfection of Texts for Nothing'6 and 
later in the study makes the following revealing observation on Comment C’est 
(How It Is): ‘We are spectators at a ballet, formal and untroubled by any reality 
but its own, by any principle but that, inevitable and serene, of its growth and 
rapid decline’7. 
Such an unlikely reading as this in which the fiction (or any fiction for 
that matter) could be conceived of as 'untroubled by any reality but its own' is, 
however, undoubtedly helped by Beckett's own artistic approach (an approach 
which has been largely misunderstood) not only in terms of his bilingualism but 
also in his evolving minimalistic method; a method which increasingly closes off 
references to an external world until we are apparently left with only the comple-
te inner realm of the text and to which all previous examples of his work seem 
merely fossils on the road to simplification. We can further add to the reasons for 
this failure to appreciate fully the development of Beckett's fictions when we consi-
der the way he employs a visible intertextual weave, though not exclusively, with 
other elements of his own work. Connor, on considering this problem, writes: 
 
Our belief in the self-containment of literary texts is liable to encounter diffi-
culties with Beckett's work, anyway. For, in a real sense, his books are items in 
a series, rather than single, self-enclosed elements, so that the metonymic rela-
tionship of part to whole which is that of the title to the text is duplicated by 
                                                          
6 Text for Nothing was originally written in French (Textes pour rien) during 1950-52 following 
the completion of L'Innommable (1949-50). Fletcher points out that these, rather aptly titled 
pieces, were produced at a time when Beckett could write very little following the enormous 
effort of The Trilogy. In fact, it is not until Comment C'est (1958-60) that Beckett will produce 
such a sustained period of creativity (The Novels of Samuel Beckett, p. 194). 
7 Ibidem, p. 216. 
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the metonymic relationships of the novels to each other in the series which 
runs from More Pricks than Kicks through to the Trilogy and beyond8. 
 
For example, Texts for Nothing consciously refers to the two previous 
books of The Trilogy as well as to earlier works such as Waiting for Godot.  
We find that The Trilogy similarly sets out to develop this approach, creating  
at times the sense if not of a single text or body of work undergoing constant 
transformation, than that of a single if imaginary consciousness breathing them 
into life. I use the word imaginary in the sense that the conscious self is located as 
part of the narrative structure and not vice versa. 
We can see then how this on the surface might suggest the notion that 
language is everything and the place in which character and identity reside.  
Professor Ricks in his highly entertaining Beckett's Dying Words9, attempts to 
dispel such an idea when considering Beckett's fiction. However, Ricks' approach 
is not always appropriate to the general thrust of his argument which we someti-
mes lose sight of through his exuberant and self-conscious love for the medium, 
taking great delight in the art of parody and the rich employment of the literary 
pun (along with an attempt to show that Beckett is essentially a better writer in 
English than in French). Though Ricks often employs this technique in order to 
explore Beckett's own approach to language, it, nevertheless, tends ironically to 
undercut the overall thrust of his argument by continually reasserting, even if 
unintentionally, the primacy of language over all else. 
However, there is a very serious side to Ricks' work which is worth men-
tioning here because of its relevance to our general argument. This comes across 
in his concern to point out a curious 'tropism' in Beckett's fiction, that is the posi-
tioning or 'alignment' of words towards death, moving language towards what it 
evokes: 
 
... it is not simply the 'syntax of weakness' but the incarnation of the human re-
ality of it all, of the piteous bodily weakness, and of the strength to contemplate 
it and realize it, which is so moving10. 
 
Ricks touches on this incidentally, for what he is principally interested in 
here is the 'syntax of weakness'11 and the way in which Beckett not only employs 
'words aligned towards death' but how death itself is incorporated into the  
                                                          
8 S. Connor, Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory and Text, Basil Blackwell 1988, pp 39-40. 
9 C. Ricks, Beckett's Dying Words, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1990. 
10 Ibidem, p. 148. 
11 Ricks notes that this term was attributed to Beckett himself by Lawrence Harvey, Samuel 
Beckett Poet and Critic. p. 249 (Beckett's Dying Words. p. 82[ft.711) Ricks goes on to claim that 
"Beckett's syntax of weakness, in the vicinity of clichés and other forms of life in death, asks  
a larger sequence than a single sentence however singular. It is not that such syntax is weak; 
rather, that it is a 'syntax of weakness', pressing on, unable to relinquish its perseverance and at 
severance" (Ibidem, pp. 82-83). 
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winding sheet of language12.  Ricks goes on to describe this 'syntax of weakness' as 
'pressing on, unable to relinquish its perseverance and arrive at severance'13,  
paradoxically denying, even in its conscious declaration, a drive towards death. 
Yet this is not the key form behind Beckett's 'syntax' as I shall go on to discuss. 
Though it is an important aspect of his writing, it is only a partial understanding 
of the set of processes he attempts to accommodate. 
 
A Poststructuralist Approach 
 
Steve Connor was to take a very different approach though similarly  
rejecting the general premise that language is the be all and end all of textual 
exploration and understanding14. Connor's fits neatly into our second category of 
Beckett criticism in that he attempts to impose a number of poststructuralist 
readings on Beckett's work. 
Connor's interest principally centres on Beckett's use of repetition and in 
doing so leans heavily on Jacques Derrida and Gilles Deleuze15. Though Connor's 
application of their theories produces an effective reading of Beckett's work, 
nevertheless much of it has the feeling of something imposed as if the fictions 
were being used to support the theoretical framework and method and not as one 
might expect vice versa. We can see this in an earlier forerunner of this approach 
and one which seems to have influenced Connor's study16, that is Butler's Samuel 
Beckett and the Meaning of Being17. Only in this case Butler is concerned with  
a direct and crude application of Heidegger's philosophy and, as he sees it, its 
natural extension in the form of Sartre's Being and Nothingness. Butler goes as 
far as to claim that: ‘Beckett's work could almost be seen as a literary exploration 
of Heideggerian metaphysics’18. Butler in the same chapter also suggests that> 
 
                                                          
12 Ricks' argument bears some similarity to an earlier essay by Georges Bataille who speaks of 
'language' as that which determines this regulated world, whose simplifications provide the 
foundations of our cultures, our activities and our relations, but it does so in so far as it  
is reduced to a means of these cultures, activities and relations; freed from these servitudes, it is 
nothing more than a deserted castle whose cracks let in the wind and rain: it is no longer the 
signifying word, but the defenceless expression death wears as a disguise. (G. Bataille, Molloy's 
Silence, in: Modern Critical Interpretations: Samuel Beckett's Molloy, Malone Dies, The 
Unnamable, Edited by H. Bloom 1988. p. 16). 
13 Ch. Ricks, Beckett's Dying Words, p. 83. 
14 See: S. Connor, Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory and Text. 
15 Connor in particular refers to Jacques Derrida's Writing and Difference, trans. A. Bass, 
Routledge and K. Paul 1978 & G. Deleuze, Différence et Répétition, Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris 1968. 
16 Indeed Connor in his notes points to Lance St John Butler 'for a discussion of Heideggerian 
parallels in Beckett's works’. S. Connor, Samuel Beckett, Repetition, Theory and Text. p. 204. 
17 L.S. Butler, Samuel Beckett and The Meaning of Being, Macmillan Press, London 1984. 
18 Ibidem, p. 7. 
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If his (Beckett's) work is taken as a whole we can see that the heavily ironic  
treatment of philosophy in the early novels gives way to desperation in the later 
work that seems rather beyond being helped by metaphysics or even logic19. 
 
Hence a need for a Heideggerian understanding of being. However,  
Butler misses the point; it is not 'desperation' which drives Beckett or the narra-
tors of his work to abandon metaphysics or logical thought, but rather a sense of 
desperation is derived, at least partially, from being forced to think in such terms. 
The difference is a subtle one but crucial to an understanding of Beckett's work 
for even Heidegger's concept of 'Dasein' is enough to drive one of Beckett's cha-
racters to desperation. For example, Butler interprets the concept of 'Dasein'  
as follows: 
 
So the analysis of Dasein (which I shall treat henceforth as an English word) 
will lead to any possible answers about the meaning of being in general and 
Dasein is man, but man with a special emphasis, man as the entity that is  
there'. Not only that, man is also the entity that 'comports itself towards the 
question of Being: Dasein is the questioner as well as the questioned... 
Thus in fact three categories emerge from Heidegger's opening remarks  
[to Being and Time]: Being, Being-there (Dasein) and the 'understanding' with 
which Dasein already comports itself towards Being. The 'understanding' is  
here apparent as an 'inquiry'20. 
 
In refutation of Butler it is possible to argue in this context that Dasein as 
representing both 'Being-there' and the ability to 'enquire' on our individual state 
of Being in relation to the circumambient universe is precisely what the Becket-
tian hero attempts to escape from. These are all elements of the world of repre-
sentation to which both subject and object can be ultimately reduced and thus 
discarded. We can conclude then that Butler approaches Beckett's work purely as 
a philosopher and cannot understand that it ultimately attempts to shed all phi-
losophies21. 
Connor's study, though equally linguistic as theoretical, interestingly falls 
into the same trap as Butler in attempting to situate Beckett securely in contem-
porary theory. For example, it is significant and rather predictable that Connor in 
his attempt to demonstrate how Beckett goes beyond the normal representational 
world, also marginalises Schopenhauer whose extreme and gloomy philosophy 
without doubt most strongly influenced Beckett's own thought and uncompromi-
                                                          
19 Ibidem, p. 13. 
20 Ibidem, p. 10. 
21 We can compare this apparent simplification to Ruby Cohen's location in Beckett's work of the 
universal 'everyman' or Dearlove's assertion that Beckett is moving towards the presentation of 
'archetypes'. 
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sing aesthetic22. Connor's mentions him only once in the course of his entire book 
and that in a brief and rather incidental fashion, and like Butler directly substitu-
tes him for Heidegger23. 
In not considering Schopenhauer Connor fails to understand what  
Beckett is attempting to get across in his early essay on Proust (11-93). Connor 
asks (supposing it to be a key problem in Beckett's argument) “but how can the 
self be an 'essence' and the seat of 'decantation' at the same time”24. Yet Connor 
so conspicuously ignores Schopenhauer where the answer to this paradox so 
clearly lies. For this divide presented in the Proust essay is crucial to any attempt 
to understand the intentions lying within Beckett's artistry. 
 
Beckett and Schopenhauer 
 
On looking at Schopenhauer's seminal work, World as Will and Repre-
sentation, we find he employs Kant's division of mind into known and knowing. 
For example, in Volume Two of his great work Schopenhauer sums up the kno-
wing' which corresponds to the world of representation and includes both the 
individual subject as well as paradoxically the so-called objective world of things. 
 
                                                          
22 For example, Harold Bloom in his Introduction to Modern Critical Interpretations: Samuel 
Beckett's Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable writes that ‘his (Beckett's) Cartesian dualism 
seems to me less fundamental than his profoundly Schopenhauerian vision' (Modern Critical 
Interpretations, p. I [see also pp. I – 121]). Bloom interestingly mentions here the clear Carte-
sian influence that is apparent especially in Beckett's earlier work; however, in suggesting the 
preeminent influence of Schopenhauer we have a hint here of Beckett's eventual abandonment 
of Descartes in order to shape his work on more Schopenhauerian lines. I am not saying that 
Beckett's fictions are an expression of Schopenhauer's philosophy, but only that it is fundamen-
tal to the development of his art. 
23 It is interesting to note in this context that Butler fails to mention Schopenhauer even once in 
the entire course of his study. David H. Helsa, in his major study of Beckett's fictions, also leans 
heavily on Heidegger for theoretical support (D.H. Helsa, The Shape of Chaos: An Interpreta-
tion of the Art of Samuel Beckett, The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1971. See 
also: R.L. Klawitter, Being and Time in Samuel Beckett's Novels, Dissertation Abstracts Inter-
national, Ann Arbor, MI. 1966, 26, 7320; Livio Dobrez, Beckett and Heidegger in the Southern 
Review: Literary and Interdisciplinary Essays 7, South Australia 1974, pp. 140-53; A. Thither, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, the Unnameable, and Some Thoughts on the Status of Voice in 
Fiction in Samuel Beckett, in: Humanistic Perspectives, Ohio State University Press, Columbus 
1983, pp. 80-90). 
24 S. Connor, Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory and Text, p. 48. Connor is referring to the 
following passages from the Proust essay: “The individual is the seat of a constant decantation 
from the vessel containing the fluid of future time, sluggish pale and monochrome, to the vessel 
containing the fluid of past time, agitated and multicoloured by the phenomena of its hours.” 
(Beckett, Proust and the Three Dialogues, p. 15). “But here, in that ‘gouffe interdit å nos sondes', 
is stored the essence of ourselves, the best of our many selves and their concretions that the 
simplest call the world, the best because accumulated slyly and painfully and patiently under the 
nose of our vulgarity, the fine essence of a smothered divinity whose whispered 'disfazione' is 
drowned in the healthy bawling of an all embracing appetite, the pearl that may give the lie to 
our carapace of paste and pewter (Ibidem, p. 31). 
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The fundamental mistake of all systems is the failure to recognize the truth, 
namely that the intellect and matter are correlatives, in other words, the one 
exists only for the other; both stand and fall together; the one is only the 
other's reflex. They are in fact one and the same thing, considered from two 
opposite points of view; and this one thing - here I am anticipating - is the 
phenomenon of the will or of the thing-in-itself (W&R.Vol.ii. 15-16)25. 
 
After reducing the 'knowing' or understandable universe to merely repre-
sentative aspects or 'phenomenon of the will' Schopenhauer later goes on to clarify 
this distinction between the phenomenal world of the knowing subject and that 
of the 'known' (will or thing-in-itself). He further suggests how the thing-in-itself 
becomes the true known' of the individual. 
 
In consequence of all this, on the path of objective knowledge, thus starting 
from the representation, we shall never get beyond the representation, i.e., the 
phenomenon. We shall therefore remain at the outside of things; we shall 
never be able to penetrate into their inner nature, and investigate what they 
are in themselves. So far I agree with Kant. But now, as the counterpoise to this 
truth, I have stressed the other truth that we are not merely the knowing sub-
ject, but we ourselves are also among those realities or entities we require to 
know, that we ourselves are the thing-in-itself. Consequently, a way from 
within stands open to us to that real inner nature of things to which we cannot 
penetrate from without. It is, so to speak, a subterranean passage, a secret al-
liance, which, as if by treachery, places us all at once in the fortress that could 
be taken by attack from without. Precisely as such, the thing-in-itself can come 
into consciousness only quite directly, namely by itself being conscious of  
itself; to try to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory.  
Everything objective is representation, consequently appearance is in fact mere 
phenomenon of the brain26. 
 
The known for Schopenhauer is the Will, which is effectively the seat of 
primal desire and of those elements that essentially constitute our innate charac-
teristics, not only connecting us with our species, but also predetermining an 
essentially fixed individual personality. The 'intelligible character' as Schopen-
hauer called it, which we come to understand (if ever) only over time27. We can 
                                                          
25 Schopenhauer, World as Will and Representation, Volume II, Translated by E.F.J. Payne, 
Dover Publications. New York 1966, p. 15-16. 
26 Ibidem, p. 195. 
27 The character of each individual man, in so far as it is individual and not entirely included in 
that of the species, can be as a special idea, corresponding to a particular act of objectification of 
the will. This act itself would then be his intelligible character, and his empirical would be the 
phenomenon. The empirical character is entirely determined by the intelligible character that is 
groundless, that is to say, will as thing-in-itself... The empirical character must in the course of  
a lifetime furnish a copy of the intelligible character, and cannot turn out differently from what 
is demanded by the latter’s inner nature (Ibidem, p. 158). 
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justifiably then make the direct connection between what Beckett terms the  
'essence' (a term Schopenhauer himself used interchangeably with the Will)28 
with this idea of a predetermined or innate character. As for 'decantation of self 
this can be taken synonymously with the knowing or rational parts of consciou-
sness. This is largely created through experience and abstract understanding and 
therefore unlike the known or Will it is unstable in its identity, and relies in  
its consistency on social positioning and language, and liable to change and 
fragmentation depending on context and externalities. The knowing part of 
consciousness cannot effect the known, though the known itself certainly has  
a large say in how we respond and deal with the world. 
Connor's failure to see this is a serious one, for though he does not take 
language as the be all and end all of his analysis, he ultimately leans in that direc-
tion. In his effective discussion on repetition Connor concentrates on the double 
tension it creates: 
 
Repetition can involve both the promotion of the materiality of a sign and the 
erasure of that materiality. Repetition can often be read as an attempt to close 
the gap between word and thing, even though it is repetition which instantly 
opens the gap29. 
 
What he is effectively expressing here is an awareness that repetition can 
act through its very consistency to stabilise the connection between word and 
object, while at the same time reinforces to us that the whole process is a lingu-
istic device, and so the separation between them is made all the more clear.  
Yet Connor in effect gets no further than this and so does not go on to look at the 
accommodation of the creative process or drive itself. However, it seems to me 
that Beckett seeks a language subordinate to desire and not vice versa: what lan-
guage contains beyond meaning and to which the repetitiveness of linguistic 
expression is only a shadow. For repetition is a way of both inclusion and con-
forming to the Will. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This connection with Schopenhauer is crucial to our understanding of 
Beckett's work and though itself is equally open to misreading, nevertheless,  
                                                          
28 For example, Schopenhauer considers that: “It is only this application of reflection which no 
longer lets us stop at the phenomenon, but leads us onto the thing-in-itself. Phenomenon is 
representation and nothing more. All representation, be it of whatever kind it may, all object is 
phenomenon. But only the will is thing-in-itself, as such it is not representation at all, but in toto 
genere different therefrom. It is that of which all representation, all object is the phenomenon, 
the visibility, the objectivity. It is the innermost essence [My italics], the kemel, of every 
particular thing and also of the whole” (Ibidem, p. 110). 
29 S. Conner, Samuel Beckett: Repetition, Theory and Text, p. 33. 
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is too easily discarded in attempts to fit Beckett securely with more contemporary 
textual reading and theory.30 This has been the principle fault of the second crite-
ria of criticism I have broadly drawn attention to here. It reads more like an im-
posing of theoretical perspectives than a true opening of the text. However, as  
I suggested we can see from this that both critical approaches, for the most part, 
are only concerned with the knowing, the world of experience and understan-
ding, of representation. Ricks, despite his criticism of the formalist approach 
stopped at the edge of the dying word, only able to suggest what lies beyond in 
that vast uncontainable space, lying at the very edge of linguistic possibility; while 
to appreciate Beckett's work fully we must go that little bit further and attempt to 
understand something of his search for the known. 
This distinction is critical to an understanding of Beckett's work and 
what we need to grasp is that here we have an art form, which ironically recogni-
ses the failure of artistic expression, and yet paradoxically fully accepts, and inde-
ed incorporates, the definite need for such an expression. Commentators on Bec-
kett's work have generally stood only on the side of the knowing in which are 
located problems of language, identity and tradition, but have not attempted to 
understand the nature of the known, the force or set of characteristics that leads 
the individual to make an expression of these things in the first place. 
In relation to the above research, I propose that in attempting to explore 
the nature and terms of Beckett's developing aesthetic it is important firstly to 
look at the way he challenges the knowing (in Schopenhauerian terms) in order 
to point us beyond the limitations and falsehoods of representation. Secondly,  
it becomes necessary to demonstrate how Beckett, in achieving this, seeks to 
incorporate or find the known: that which essentially lies beyond representa-
tion31. 
                                                          
30 Deidre Bair, for example, writing on Beckett's life during 1928-9, emphasises in particular the 
growing influence of Schopenhauer: “Schopenhauer's ideas would become in later years the 
philosophical foundation of much of Beckett's thought and the system with which he felt most 
at ease [My italics], but at this time, his thoughts were still far-reaching and chaotic. He worried 
about the impossibility of language and the repeated failure to communicate on any meaningful 
level. He was coming to the Schopenhauerian conclusion that, since the only function of intellect 
is to assist man in achieving his will, the best role for himself would be the total avoidance of any 
participation in a world governed by will. The doctrine suited him but at the time made him 
uneasy. He coped by returning to Descartes and mindlessly filling the pages of his notebooks 
with Descartes' thoughts and sayings” (D. Bair, Samuel Beckett: A Biography, Vintage, London 
1990, pp. 83-4). 
31 Interestingly Li-Ling Tseng in an article published in 1992 suggests that a tension exists with-
in Beckett’s later prose fictions which is generated a conflict between a 'syntax of energy' and  
a 'syntax of weakness'. We have already touched on the characteristics of Beckett's syntax of 
weakness in relation to Christopher Ricks, however Tseng isolates another form of syntax within 
Beckett's work, one which 'still maintains a control of human will in (the) process creative 
(p.103). However, in spite of similarities, this division between different forms of syntax does 
not conform to the Schopenhauerian split we have defined here (Li-Ling Tseng, Samuel Beck-
ett's For to End Yet Again: A Conflict Between 'Syntax of Energy' and 'Syntax of Weakness', in: 
Twentieth Century Literature: A Scholarly and Critical Journal 38:1, 1992 Spring. pp. 101-23. 
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